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 The ‘explanatory gap’ (Levine 1983) refers to a gap between physical and phenomenal 
explanations of consciousness. I wish to show that we can take the gap on board and still go on to 
develop an explanation or model that is aware of and refers to both sides of this gap, similar to Varela's 
Neurophenomenology(1996).  Also such a model may refer to both sides via the postulation of a 
descriptive instrumental variable without the need to postulate another ontological category beyond the 
mind's and brain's identity (Levine 1983). The variable's values will be determined by both first and 
third person data working in unison. Attributing consciousness to agents is done through an adaptation 
of Dennett’s Intentional Stance (1981). However, proposing such a model and in my use of first person 
data to facilitate this, Dennett will be my chief opponent, so his objections to such an approach will 
receive the most attention.  
 
2. The explanatory gap 
 
 The explanatory gap is just that; a gap in explanation. There seem to be two sides or 
possibilities for explanations of consciousness, which are often considered to be at odds. That is there 
are third person objective theories and explanations and then there are first person subjective 
understandings. I do not think that these two should be thought of as at odds but I do think there is a 
substantive and fundamental gap between them. This is an epistemic gap in the way we come to know 
both sides (Levine 1983, 2001). The first person is immediate, in many ways private, includes 
characteristics such as agency and subjectivity; and generally speaking is itself conscious. These are all 
characteristics that are not found in third person theorising, though they may at best loosely describe 
these traits. This difference, between first person appreciation of a situation and that which can be 
arrived at through third person means, is made vivid by Tomas Negal (1974) when he demonstrates 
that we will never “know what it is like to be a bat”.  
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 This gap between understandings can also be viewed as being analogous to and consistent with 
the problem of other minds, that is that we are shut off from knowing directly the content and 
experience of other people’s minds. It seems that this is a necessary, intrinsic, product of agency. The 
only means we have at our disposal is to infer that it is the case that other people think in a similar 
fashion to you, it is not possible to deduce this (Van Gulick 2006). 
 
 Given that we have this explanatory gap and that we still want an explanation of consciousness, 
where do we go from here? I think that we should be able to develop a model that explicitly refers to 
both sides of the gap, taking as much information about first person experience as we can get on one 
side and third person findings and theory, on the other. Only by utilizing both sides together can we 
hope to achieve an understanding of consciousness that is in any way full. 
 
3. Developing a model 
 In developing an explanatory model, are we not losing the very thing that this model sets out to 
include, i.e. the first person side? To some extent yes, in that once in the public domain of the model, 
the aspect of experience is lost. This is why we have to discuss consciousness in the public domain as 
an instrumental variable. And no, to the extent that the model I advocate is explicit about inclusion of a 
subject with experience there in the experiment. The experience is still there, it is in the subject. 
 
This variable should represent consciousness, and correspond to instances of personal 
consciousness experienced by a subject and also the sub-personal events going on in that subject. 
 
So what we need for explanation is a bridge to get us from the vocabulary of thought to the 
vocabulary of the physical. This may be done by simply stipulating one as a variable (C), whose 
purpose is to act as an explanatory tool in moving between vocabularies. The C variable changes 
according to what comes down to two inputs: - phenomenal first person data, and - physical third 
person data. 
 
 What do I mean by a variable? Here I defer to the definition offered by Whitehead and 
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Russell in Principia Mathematica (1910 i.4) of a variable as “any symbol whose meaning is not 
determinate is called a variable. If a statement is made about ‘Mr A and Mr B’, ‘Mr A’ and ‘Mr B’ are 
variables whose values are confined to men.” So I take it the meaning is flexible, and hence might be 
capable of covering the vast diversity of people’s opinions about what consciousness is, yet whose 
values can be determined by actual instantiations of consciousness (tokens). A variable is therefore 
secondary to the primary instantiations to which it refers. 
 
Getting to the physiological happening is not methodologically a problem as it basically 
involves inculcting the corpus of neuroscience. Getting information about the other, phenomenal side is 
a bit trickier.  
 
What is a first person methodology? It is one that takes the first person seriously. It accepts that 
there is something ‘it is like’ to be conscious, that there is experience, and attempts to get data on this. 
Whether or not such data is possible will be a preoccupation here. It also means in order to develop a 
full understanding of consciousness, actual experience is a necessary part of the story, (here my chief 
opponent will be Dennett (6)). Disciplined phenomenology in its various guises as the project of 
describing experience, (Neurophenomenology 1996, 2003) will be of great aid in the production of 
such data. Describing experience is exactly what is needed if we want to get a discussion of 
consciousness of the ground. By 'describing' experience, preferably in a systematic fashion (Varela 
1996), we are getting as much of first person experience into the public domain as is possible. So our 
descriptions, responses and their confirmation that describe the first person experience are the maximal 
means we now have, and will possibly ever have, for getting something that allows an explanation to 
run between the first person experience and third person understanding. So the first person data, as 
discussed by Varela, is in the form of a structured report by the first person about their particular 
phenomenal experience. It therefore represents the content of conscious experience / thought, but is in 
the form of a report; so is broadcastable in the third person domain. 
 
Such a methodology does however allow us, as investigators, to tentatively or instrumentally 
attribute consciousness to agents, if they say they have it (and there is no other reason to think that they 
might be lying or wrong (Goldman 2004)). Making this latter move is not dissimilar to Dennett's 
intentional stance (1981) except it goes one step further (than beliefs and intentions) all the way to 
consciousness (see 6). Attributing consciousness to agents in this way is the commonsensical and best 
  5  
explanation, inferred to in everyday usage of such terms as e.g. thinking. 
 
 I should, however stress that setting up the first person against third in this manner is only for 
the sake of highlighting that there is a contrast between the two, in terms of epistemology. It would be 
wrong to say that they are completely opposed or at odds. As I wish to maintain the working hypothesis 
of token identity between the two sides, between mind and body, it makes sense that they should not be 
at odds, but that the good work in the field is to be found when the two sides are in agreement, when a 
phenomenal change corresponds to a physiological change. They are just different ways of 
understanding the same event. 
 
The reason why I opted for an instrumental variable is because of the explanatory gap. That we 
collectively are shut off from knowing directly the content of other people’s minds, means that any 
explanation we give will be necessarily incomplete. Third person explanations will always fall short of 
the mark because by their very nature they can not swell to include the conscious first person 
experience itself. It is this loss of perspective, loss of information, that is the reason why we cannot be 
any stronger in our claims of theories of consciousness than to infer (and not deduce) a tool that is 
going to do little more than aid our explanations, predictions and discussions. It may refer to the 
physical and phenomenal instanciations, tokens on both sides of the gap, but itself is only a tool.a 
 
A working hypothesis I take to be one of token identity (see below). However, as Kim 
(2005,ch4) points out, identity statements alone have little or no explanatory value. If one of the only 
reasons to go beyond identity is the epistemic need for an explanation, then this is yet another reason 
for which we should invoke an instrumental variable, because it is only this epistemic consideration, a 
need for explanation, that forces us to postulate another category. This should not force us to evoke 
another ontological category (Levine 1983,2001). However, the postulation of the variable, acting as a 
‘bridge-law’ might be enough to prevent this form being viewed as a reductive explanation (Kim 2005 
Ch4, also see note f). 
 
I wish to emphasise that such third person instrumentalism, the absence of anything ‘real’ that 
                                                 
a
 Varela et al (1991) use empathy to make a similar inferential jump as I have indicated. 
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you might call consciousness in the third person, does not mean that there is nothing that is 
consciousness. It is not elimitivism. Quite the opposite; it is the result of an epistemic consideration that 
means that 'we' cannot know something collectively, but 'I' or 'you', in the first person can know it. Also 
it does not mean that the actual tokenings, instances of physical activity that embodied consciousness 
are not real, they may be, its just that our understanding of them is limited. So although this might be 
considered a strongly anti-realist view in the third person, it might also be thought of as a form of 
realism in the first person; such a position has been dubbed ‘qualia realism’ (Chrisley, Aleksander 
2006, Van Gulick 2006).  
 
A theory based on inference should give us cause to be cautious. But how cautious? I think the 
mere fact that we can make predictions (some of them quite accurate) from third person measures to 
first person phenomenal content, means that we don’t have to be too careful. I think, roughly our 
caution should track common sense, because it would allow us to investigate the subject in question, 
which is agents with consciousness.  
 
The Set up 
 
 I will briefly describe how the C variable can be utilised within experiments to provide 
understanding that at least refers to both sides of the mind / body gap.  
 
At this stage, what such a model would look like may seem unclear. Essentially, I see the 
model as being a graphic in visual space (as the visual modality conveys the greatest amount of 
explanatory information). Because of various restraints I have not been able to show a mock-up of the 
model. But to help clarify what I intend; it would be a graphical representation of C running in real 
time and driven by the measurements gained from physiology, and also keyed and driven by first 
person data.  
 
 As we want the variable to correspond to both mind and brain (personal and sub-personal 
activity respectively) it should have two inputs. Sub-personal neuronal / brain activity of a subject can 
be measured using a variety of invasive and non-invasive techniques (for (fMRI (functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging) see for example Ffytche et al 1998), (for EEG (Electroencephalography) for 
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example see Sergent et al 2005 or Laureys et al 2001),(for Electrophysiology see for example 
Penfield(1954)). The activity measured is taken as one of the inputs for the model. The other input is 
taken to be the subjective experience of the subject of the experiment, as conveyed to us through report 
by the subject (assuming we can trust the subject, see 3&4). 
 
 If this is possible, then we can use it to make testable predictions, the major limitation to 
which would be the fineness of grain of our data (both in terms of the limitation first person methods / 
data and third person methods, technology and data). The finer we can grind the grains the closer we 
can get in the direction of making predictions and making the claim that we can read other people's 
minds. Although we might never be able to get all the way there (due to the explanatory gap) we might 
still be able to get within a hair's breath, to the point of being able to tell / predict the content, with high 
fidelity, of some one’s phenomenal experience from physiological activity alone (such protocols are 
used by Haynes et al 2005). We can even go on to confirm these through evoking a phenomenal 
experience of the same type in another subject. This refinement will involve working on agreement 
between first and third person data. To ask any more of a theory, than conformation of such fine grain 
physical and phenomenal identity through prediction and test, seems to me question begging.  
 
This is not dualism 
 
 Acceptance of the explanatory gap is often thought to imply dualism, but this is not the 
interpretation its original presentation was supposed to have (Levine 1983). Levine (1983, 2001) takes 
it to be an epistemic gap between explanations and says this is the reason for the apparent contingency 
of identity claims and rejects the move between conceivability to possibility (Kripke 1972, Chalmers 
1996) that results in an ontological difference and dualism. I defer to these arguments (Levine 
1983,2001) for justification of a monist basis for my theory.  
 
 Acceptance of the explanatory gap may cause difficulties if the theory were based around type 
identities (as types refer across people) so I instead try to base in token identities, and develop an 
instrumental view regarding types. The ultimate reference for what consciousness is, is to be found in a 
subject as instances of their physical and phenomenal activity together. 
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4. Problems with first person methodologies 
 
 To reiterate, we want to get subjects with subjective phenomenal experience in our experiments. 
This alone is all that is really needed to do battle with the claim that something is being left out, which 
is often the claim of the critic of theories of mind / brain identity. They (e.g. Chalmers 1996) urge that 
we are leaving out the 'what it is like' aspect of experience; it is there in the subject of the experiment as 
his or her experience. This is nothing particularly new; it is almost of a working assumption in 
neuroscience (Dennett aside for now). 
 
 In developing this theory the connection between the C variable and the first person must be 
secured. So we, collectively, need to attempt to get some grasp of what the subject is thinking; we 
require data. One framework, through which this has been done is Neurophenomenology (Varela); 
another is Marbach's use of Husserl (2005). A more general framework is that of phenomenology and 
all that that involves: especially but not exclusively introspective methods and the gathering of first 
person reports as first person data. This will involve a loss of at least perspective, ownership and 
experience itself. This does not prevent the C variable from referring to and describing both sides and 
neither does it prevent us from making predictions. Still, in producing a variable we must shore up the 
connection with first person data, because obtaining data that corresponds to experience is what is 
needed by the model to get it up and running. This will not be that straightforward, as it will be 
hindered by the problems of first person data and methodologies which have a long and destructive 
history, involving behaviorism and in its latest guise, the anti-first person methodologies of Dennett. 
 
 As stated the model is accepting of the explanatory gap (that is why an instrumental variable is 
used) and the model will rely on getting first person data, so any problems with first person data that 
are not wholly due to the explanatory gap are going to cause problems and so deserve attention. 
However, as the explanatory gap is normally a problem (if not the problem) for the development of 
such mind/brain theories, (as opposed to a premise, as it is here) it is often conflated with other 
problems of first person methodologies. So if there are other problems they must now be faced, hence I 
must first separate out the other problems for first person methodologies, and then show that they are 
surmountable. They are surmountable through development of experimental protocols that can take 
account of these ‘other’ problems, while the explanatory gap is not. And as far as these other problems 
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are inextricably intertwined with the explanatory gap, their impact may be lessened or accounted for in 
the interpretation of data with such instrumental methods as that indicated by the model. 
 
 So what are the problems faced by first person methodologies? Broadly speaking, they seem to 
fall into three categories: reactivity, reproducibility (Ericsson 2003) and mistakes / getting it wrong. A 
particular aspect of the problem of reactivity is highlighted by Dennett as the reason we cannot 
interpret first person data as indications of consciousness, so this will receive particular attention. 
 
 The major problems faced by third person methodologies is the explanatory gap. Beyond this, 
there are the empirical problems of neuroscience and psychology. These will only receive attention as 




 Essentially the problem of reactivity is that being aware of something is one thing and being 
able to report it is another. That is, the act of producing a report itself affects a task, as communicating 
a phenomenal event to the outside itself requires cognitive activity in addition to that of the 
phenomenal event. As Snodgrass (2006) puts it, “direct unmediated reports do not exist”. This can be 
simply and effectively demonstrated (Gagne and Smith 1962 reported in Ericsson 2003) by showing 
that the performance of a task is altered by a request for a report, by comparison to controls, who were 
not required to give a report. 
 
 The problem of reactivity differs from the explanatory gap in that it all happens before anyone 
else receives or interprets the output. Reactivity as a problem is due to the process of monitoring and 
development of a report being a additional piece of cognition (and experience) that is secondary to the 
primary process of experience. But both processes (the experience and being aware of the experience) 
are internal to the subject, they do not require a move to the third person in order for them to take 
effect. So this is a problem for first person methods that is independent of the explanatory gap. If the 
problem of reactivity can be disentangled from the explanatory gap in this way, then reactivity may 
well be interpreted as resulting from a difference between what we are experientially conscious of, 
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being something different or requiring a separate, additional act required in order that we can access or 
pay attention to it. It is easy to see why reactivity is often conflated with the explanatory gap when it is 
taken into account that the production of a report allowing the move into the third person domain 
requires that the move be made from experience to access (if such a division exists) in order for there to 
be a report produced. However, the ‘explanatory gap’ only really kicks in when someone else tries to 
work out 'exactly' what it is you were thinking / experiencing. The gap between experience and access 
on the other hand does not have to involve anyone else. b 
 
 I think this aspect of reactivity can be most clearly understood through the use of the 
differentiation between Phenomenal (P) and Access (A) consciousness made by Block (1994 
1995).This is a common and much talked about differentiation in the literature. P-Consciousness is 
experience (See Block 1995 where Block gives his reasons for which we should not expect a fuller 
reductive definition, which is essentially the explanatory gap). Block gives a three fold definition in 
terms of the sufficient (but not necessary) conditions for a state of A-consciousness: “a representation 
of its content is (1) inferentially promiscuous.., i.e. poised to be used as a premise in reasoning, and (2) 
poised for [rational] control of action and (3) poised for rational control of speech.(1995 p237)” So A-
consciousness, I take it is the side of consciousness that is conceptual, representational and allows the 
formulation of a report - essentially, intentional and belief states. And P-consciousness refers to the 
experiancal, qualitative side of things where the elusive qualia lurk (see 6).  In this respect the 
differentiation between P and A consciousness mirrors that offered by Peacock (2001) between Non-
Conceptual content and Conceptual content (as noted by Block 1995), where thought with conceptual 
content corresponds to A-consciousness and non-conceptual content is likely to reside in P-
consciousness. This helps to elucidate why A-consciousness is expressible: it has concepts, and there 
are difficulties in expressing P-consciousness because it is devoid of concepts on which to base a 
description. The point that Peacock (2001) makes is that conceptual content could not explain the 
richness of experience; there simply are not enough concepts to do that. Another way to understand A-
consciousness, discussed in the literature, is in terms of meta-cognition, which highlights the ‘level 
above’ or monitoring aspects of this mode of cognition. 
                                                 
b Reactivity is not to be confused with the problem of reflexivity, which I see as an expression of the explanatory 
gap, because it refers to the point that any theory of thought proposed by a researcher will itself be a thought, 
hence circular and reflexive, and is yet another reason why an instrumental variable should be used. 
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 The idea of P- and A-consciousness is controversial, as is the notion of non-conceptual content. 
However, it is not my purpose to discuss the pros and cons of these theories. Neither have I any need to 
do so, as I am only using them to clarify a point about the problems of reactivity and first person 
methods.  
 
 No doubt I am likely to be accused of conflation myself in my combination of reactivity and the 
difference between A- and P-consciousness, or beliefs and conscious experience. But if we take away 
the ‘explanatory gap’, take away the report, its interpretation, anything that involves the movement 
between first and third person (and deal with this separately (see 3)), we still find there is a problem of 
reactivity. It is hard to see how it could come down to anything other than the result of there being a 
difference between raw experience and the secondary, meta-cognitive, A-consciousness process.   
 
 Reactivity, once the explanatory gap is removed, then can be seen as the additional cognitive act 
required in going from P-consciousness to A-consciousness. That is, phenomenal experience is one 
thing, and accessing this (formulating a belief or an intention about it) is another supposedly additional 
act.  So in measuring physiological activity that co-varies with a phenomenal experience, how can we 
be sure that we are not measuring the correlates of the development of an intention to act or belief state 
(its access) rather than those of the experience itself? This is a way in which the problem of reactivity 
presents itself to a first person methodology that wishes to talk to a third person science (See 5 P no A 
third section). However, there is an additional aspect to the problem that arises from the division of 
consciousness into P- and A-consciousness or the separation of beliefs and consciousness. 
 
 Dennett’s first problem for first person methology 
 
 What seems to me the more substantive aspect of the problem of reactivity, is that put forward 
by Dennett (2001, 2003, 2005) as the reason for which the intentional stance cannot go all the way in 
attributing consciousness to agents, it should stop at intentions. That is the possibility that there might 
be A without P or P without A or, in Dennett’s terms, the possibility of beliefs without consciousness 
or consciousness without beliefs (See 2003 p21,2005 p44). Strictly speaking Dennett does not accept 
the P & A distinction, instead choosing to draw the same line in a different place, between beliefs and 
  12  
conscious experience (but here nothing much rides on where the line is drawn). As A-consciousness, 
beliefs are prerequisites of report and report is the only means we have at our disposal for getting to 
consciousness, then first person methods relying on the collection of data about consciousness have a 
problem, if beliefs are independent of consciousness. This is an aspect of the problem of reactivity, as it 
stems from the idea that a belief is a secondary act to the experience and results in data available from 
the first person being incomplete. This aspect is termed, by Dennett (2003,2005), ‘outrunning’. 




 Having reproducible data is a central tenet of scientific methodology. That is that Science is 
based on regularities, and if you cannot be sure that you have regularities then science of mind has a 
problem. Here science cannot be sure that there are regularities because the privacy of the first person 
experiential perspective precludes there being such direct interpersonal inter-subjective checks as could 
inform us of regularities on the first person side. This aspect is an expression of the explanatory gap, 
and is again a reason to treat consciousness, in the third person domain tentatively and instrumentally. 
Use of Within-subject measures may not be limited in this respect, because they are not dependent on 
interpersonal factors and may therefore help in setting up experiments (see below). However, they will 
be more prone to errors and will limit our ability to replicate results across all experiments. 
 
 Limitations on reproducibility also seem due to a second factor. That is, we are dealing with a 
highly complex system in a state of constant change and variability, composed of highly complex 
phenomenal and physiological events. So it should not be any surprise that, given such complexity, 
each instance or token of consciousness experience might be unique. Uniqueness clearly restrains the 
possibility of full reproduction. This is not to say that there is no possibility of working out the 
regularities (indeed, this is what I advocate in the next section). It is just that we should not be surprised 
if working out the regularities is difficult given the complexity involved. In this respect the problem of 
reproducibility in the studies of consciousness is no more limited than in the production of weather 
forecasts and can be overcome through the use of good experimental protocols (Note: this is consistent 
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with my use of the C variable in the formulation of predictions)
c
. This aspect of the problem of 
reproducibility is independent of the explanatory gap and it seems in principle surmountable.  
 
Getting it wrong 
 
 People get things wrong (Nesbit and Wilson 1977). This problem, for first person methods, is as 
simple as that. The reasons they have for making mistakes may be diverse, they may receive wrong 
information or their interpretation may be flawed in a myriad of different respects. Indeed, the ability to 
misrepresent has been used as a defining factor of an intentional system (Dretske 1981). The way to 
address this is simply to compensate for it experimentally by identifying and illuminating or avoiding 
all the factors that may lead to getting it wrong e.g. somebody having a reason to lie. 
 
 People getting it wrong, being limited in their cognitive abilities, seems to be a simple and 
complete way to explain why it is that we should be wary of the trust we can have, even in our own 
thoughts (Marcel 2003). This does not mean that there are no thoughts. Some, possibly many of them, 
might be correct, and this can be tested.  
 
 
 So there are problems for the model and a first person science of consciousness. What would be 
the wrong thing to do would be to give up and say we are measuring nothing and retreat to 
behaviourism or heterophenomenology; I would refrain from this as these methods would undoubtedly  
leave something out. This something is the ‘what it is like’ aspect to experience and this (not something 
else like  recurrent processing) needs explaining (Chalmers 1996). Describing recurrent processing will 
no doubt be informative and part of the explanation, but it should not force us to reject the thing that we 
set out to explain, i.e. conscious experience. If such an explanation of consciousness were any good, it 
                                                 
c
 The analogy of the weather forecast can be used to illustrate the explanatory gap; that is that a weather forecast 
is a scientific tool or instrument that, even if perfect, can only predict the weather. It is not the wind and rain, the 
weather itself, although the relations between the representations in the model are functionally as close as 
possible. 
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would still simply be a way of describing, complementing, conscious experience; reduction does not 
have to lead to elimination.   
 
 The barrier between conscious experiences and beliefs about those conscious experiences is not 
the same as the explanatory gap itself. The explanatory gap may well be principally insurmountable, as 
it is between the first person and others, not between divisions internal to the first person. Such internal 
issues as reactivity and the out pacing that Dennett uses as his reason for not attributing agents with 
conscious states, I hope to show are either incoherent or surmountable. 
 
 
5. Ways round 
 
Generally, prospects look bright. 
 
 The prospects for using a first person methodology to produce data that generally reflect the 
content of experience look good. There seems to be a broad agreement in the field (apart from Dennett) 
that we can arrive at data that changes in line with and refers to first person experience (see the two 
special editions of the Journal of Consciousness Studies on Trusting the subject Vol 10 no 9-10 and 
Vol 11 no 7-8, where roughly 8 out of 10 academics prefer it). In order to get such data we must first 
reduce the probability of issues such as reproducibility, reactivity and human error. 
 
 Here I will focus on methods to get round the problems indicated above, but in terms of the 
actual divisions in phenomenology that we can achieve and use to change the variable I will simply 
defer to Varela(1996) and Marbach (2005) who have discussed some of these divisions. The only 
division of this sort I will discuss will be that between P and A-consciousness. 
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Getting over reactivity and outpacing 
 
 Firstly, I wish to deal with Dennett’s claim that consciousness may outpace beliefs or beliefs 
may outpace consciousness, as I see this as the principal barrier which prevents the instrumental 
variable / the C variable from going all the way to consciousness (as advocated by Levine 1994). It 
prevents first person methodologies doing what they set out to do: getting data about conscious 
experience. 
 
A with no P 
 
 The possibility of there being beliefs without consciousness is more easily dismissed than the 
possibility of consciousness without beliefs. This is because the idea of beliefs without consciousness 
seems simply incoherent. In order to believe something, you have to know you believe it; One is 
required to think a belief state in order for it to be a belief state. Without conscious expression it is hard, 
if not impossible, to see what a belief state could be. It could be described as an implicit part of 
cognition that does not receive attention, but then I cannot see how it could be termed a belief state and 
not part of un / sub conscious processing: it is only once it receives attention and you are conscious of it 
that it becomes a belief state. There is the possibility of getting things wrong, by having a belief state 
about a conscious experience you did not in fact have (e.g. “What was I thinking?” type reasoning or 
the kind of reasoning that is thought to be found in some cases of schizophrenia), although the content 
of such belief states does not refer to a conscious state, this does not prevent the misrepresentations 
themselves from being conscious experiences. The ability to get things wrong, although troublesome 
for investigators using first person methods, does not negate the point that people can and do often 
produce veridical reports, and it certainly does not support the claim that there are beliefs that are 
devoid of conscious experience. 
 
 The possibility of there being A with no P is explored by Block (1995) where he remains 
agnostic about the possibility of actual cases of A with no P, but he is clear that it is conceptually 
possible that there might be A without P. This would take the form of Chalmers style Zombies 
(physically identical creatures to you or me but without phenomenal consciousness) or super 
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blindsighters (blindsighted people who have no phenomenal awareness of the seen in front of them but 
are still able to produce the intention to act in response to objects in their blind field (these people do 
not exist)). Remember that Dennett is arguing that because there may be A with no P we can’t go to 
consciousness with the intentional stance (2003p20-21).  Is this right? Can Dennett really be evoking 
such mythical creatures in defense of his argument? These creatures, particularly zombies, were dreamt 
up in order to do battle with the likes of Dennett’s physicalist theory, which says that there is nothing 
more to explain than the physical goings on (as, if a zombie is physically identical, but phenomenally 
different from us, physicalism has failed to tell the whole story (Chalmers 1996)). But if Dennett 
wishes to argue that there may be A- without P-consciousness or beliefs without consciousness (and his 
papers are devoid of concrete examples of this, and such a shrewd philosopher as Ned Block cannot  
provide any either), then it is hard to see how Dennett can look to anything other than the realm of 
conceptual possibility for backup. As the rebuttal of such conceptual possibilities is Dennett’s bread 
and butter, I see this as inconsistent, and suggest that the best thing to do under the circumstances is to 
reject his assertion of the natural possibility of beliefs without consciousness as incoherent. 
 
 Accusing Dennett of evoking zombies is a little harsh. He is more likely to talk of tacit beliefs 
as examples of A without P. He might say that you do not have to have thought something to hold on to 
it as a belief. For example, you may believe that 2379+2891=5270 is true, even if those specific 
thoughts (about 2379 etc) had never crossed your mind (thanks are due to Till for pointing this out). I 
would hold that this may be true and you may believe it to be true, but only once you have thought 
about it is it your belief state; or in functional language, the state must be explicitly be expressed in the 
register of an agent in order for it to count as an intentional state of that agent. This may come down to 
a difference in opinion about what a belief is. And so I wish to highlight that on Dennett’s concept of 
tacit beliefs, it is hard to see how there could be any information state that could fail to be a belief state 
of, well, everybody who has the potential to think. Allowing beliefs to be so independent of possession 
and expression means that Dennett's take on beliefs can bare little resemblance to what most people 
and psychologists take a belief to be (see for example Colman 2001, or OED). Their notion of what a 
belief state is includes the idea that, at some point, beliefs and intentions are possessed and 
apprehended by an agent. 
 
 The reason for which A- without P-consciousness is highly unlikely, is probably best 
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understood if we take A-consciousness in its meta-cognitive guise. Meta-cognition allows self 
monitoring and brings with it the notion of monitoring ‘above’, and that of a secondary (and therefore 
reactive) process that arrived relatively late in our evolutionary history (Dennett would probably agree 
with this much). If it does ‘ride above’ or monitor phenomenal consciousness in this way, it makes 
little sense for it to be found in the absence of the substrate on which it is based, i.e. phenomenal 
conscious experience.  
 
 As I am attempting to develop a natural instrumental explanation that refers to both sides of the 
actual instances of consciousness, conceptual possibility should not give me cause for concern in 
making this argument, which is about methodological approaches. I think even Chalmers the great 
advocate of conceptual possibilities, would agree with this, as he says zombies are only conceptually 
possible, not naturally (Chalmers 1996). The wider problems of conceptual possibility for the monistic 
aspect of theories such as this and mental causation, is a worry for another day. So in sum, if instances 
of A-consciousness with no P-consciousness do not exist, it is not a problem for first person science. 
  
P with no A. 
 
 This is the possibility that there may be conscious experiences that we are unable to access, 
unable to form beliefs about. This is far more troublesome than A without P, because it is far easier to 
see how it could be actually instantiated. The idea is essentially that P-consciousness may outstrip that 
which is accessible, and so the bit that surpasses A-consciousness, the bit that is purely phenomenal is 
shut off from investigation and its inclusion in first person data, as there is no access on which to base a 
report.  
 
 I think this problem can be understood in two ways, a strong and a weaker reading. The stronger  
would hold that P- with no A-consciousness may be actually instantiated and more pervasive than often 
thought. This is because if there were such phenomenal experiences without access from which we are 
altogether excluded they must be permanently shut of from access. In this case, we would have never 
known about them and therefore they could be a lot more pervasive than originally thought, because we 
are by definition shut off from the ability to form beliefs about it (this seems to be Dennett’s take 
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(2001)). However, I think that part of this is incoherent in a manner similar to that of A without P. If we 
are forever shut off from accessing this part of phenomenal consciousness, forever shut off from 
forming a belief about it, then we would never be able to say or think we were aware of it or even 
conscious of it, and P-consciousness, you will remember, is a form of consciousness. In which case, 
can we really say it was consciousness at all?  Should it even be allowed to enter our model of 
consciousness? Would it not be better to regard these as aspects or expressions of sub- or unconscious 
processing? 
 
 The example of P- without A-consciousness of blindsight (blind people who are still able to 
perform above significance in visual discrimination tasks), given by Block, is interpreted by those at 
the forefront of neuroscientific research in the area (see Cowey & Storig 1991,1997) as being just such 
an unconscious phenomenon; “characterized by an absence of any consciousness”(ibid 1997 p535).  
 
 So I find the strong reading of this problem is mistaken, as it is highly doubtful whether a notion 
of P- without A-consciousness that we are forever excluded from accessing in any way, has the right to 
call itself conscious experience. However, I doubt that this is the kind of purely phenomenal 
inaccessible state which Block is attempting to highlight.  
 
 Even if the stronger reading is incoherent, it does not negate the weaker; the weaker problem 
would rather be that there are states that are only partially accessible. As Dretske eloquently points out 
the perceiver does not have to understand something in order to see it (Dretske 1994). That is that there 
may be some aspect of experience you are aware of that is not quite graspable or expressible, 
something ineffable, intangible, which you are not quite being able to put your finger on. Again, to use 
Peacock’s notion of non-conceptual content: if there is non-conceptual content then there is an aspect 
of thought that we are shut off from describing and reporting because we do not have the concepts to 
do so. Such states are still capable of causing a problem for first person methods in the way Dennett 
wishes because there is still the inability to access part of the experience on the part of the subject, even 
though he or she is aware of the experience in the phenomenal sense.  
 
 The possibility of P without A is also a problem for Dennett (if both P and A-consciousness are 
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forms of consciousness and he claims his explanation (1991) to be complete). But instead of 
confronting the problem he seems to shift the boundary, so that A-consciousness is pretty much the 
only thing that corresponds to Dennett’s notion of consciousness. This is clearly seen in his discussion 
of “global availability” or “fame in the brain” and his conflation of beliefs and experience (as pointed 
out by Dretske 1994). Anything of P- consciousness that remains, Dennett seeks to get rid of 
completely (see 6).  
 
 I see three principal ways in which this problem can be overcome or reduced. Firstly, in the vast 
majority of conscious acts we do have access to the phenomenal aspect of consciousness. Phenomenal 
experience almost always has content that we are fully and implicitly aware of and can report on. Most 
of the time we know what we are thinking; it is what we are thinking. If in the vast majority of cases 
we do have such access and it is only in a few, contentious cases that our ability to formulate a belief or 
intention about that state is limited, then we should be justified (in most cases) in attributing 
consciousness to subjects, if they say they possess it. Further, the incidence of P with A certainly seems 
common enough to build experiments on. If experimental protocols are set up in order to avoid such 
‘not quite being able to put your finger on it’ phenomena, by using phenomenal experience that the 
subject is sure he is having as our independent variables (as the key in the above model), then we 
would have no reason to think that the subject was not capable of accessing the phenomenal aspect of 
experience, and then we can go on to attribute consciousness to him. This is a reason why I suggest 
some of the following techniques, such as ‘simplicity’. It is also consistent with the idea that we should 
set up experiments with an awareness of just this sort of phenomenology in mind. This is what 
Gallagher (2003) calls front loaded phenomenology. (How this is similar and differs from the 
intentional stance will be dealt with in section 6). In such circumstances the ability to form a report 
should not be viewed as a hindrance to the exploration of consciousness, but a key ability, an amazing 
ability we have to convey our thoughts through language. So this ability should be exploited through 
the use and acceptance of reports.  
 
 My second point here is that if there are such states that are more phenomenal than accessed, 
then can we come to access them? Can we direct attention towards the aspects of phenomenal 
experience that are in the normal course of things unattended to but experienced? If so, then there may 
be little on which Dennett’s objection is based, as the aspects of experience that are unattended to may 
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become attended and contribute to our theory. How is this done? Here I again follow Varela in saying 
we need to be serious about our phenomenological endeavors (1996). Firstly, the construction of 
rigorous phenomenological categories and understanding will help guide both the subject, in getting to 
the aspect of phenomenal experience we are interested in, and the experimenter, in providing a 
catalogue and structure to guide experimentation. Another element of this point is that practiced, 
trained and regimented introspection might well allow the subject to achieve some degree of access to 
the phenomenal nature of experience that is usually independent of access. This is what meditation 
might do for us, in bringing A- to P-consciousness. This is one of the reasons why I think skilled 
practitioners of a meditative tradition should be used in such experiments (see below).  
 
 The third and final way to tackle the problem of outpacing and reactivity is to anticipate what 
might be the result if P- and A-consciousness are or are not separable. If they are not separable, and A-
consciousness is always to some extent co-present with P-consciousness then the problem simply 
vanishes, and first person methods are justified. The only remaining concern (other than the 
explanatory gap) is finding the right words and protocols to allow data to be collected on first person 
experience (personally I favor this option, as P-and A-consciousness seem to be different points on the 
spectrum of consciousness). If, on the other hand, P-consciousness and A-consciousness are separable, 
then it should be possible to confront this experimentally. If we look at the physiological activity in the 
presence of a request for a report and compare it with the activity in the absence of such a request, the 
difference should be the activity due to the formation of a report; similar protocols are discussed by 
Ericsson (2003). Activity in the presence / absence of access can also be investigated via the use of 
masking protocols (see e.g. Sergent et al 2005). Once you have worked out what activity is due to the 
reactive, monitoring, meta-cognitive A- process, you can do what you want with it: take it away from 
other measures during cognitive experiments to leave only the activity related to the experience of the 
task rather than the activity due to forming a report on it. Or, if meta-cognition is your subject of 
interest then you should look at the difference in content between the two independent variables (with 
and without report) and the resultant change in the dependent variables (the physiological changes). In 
practice it probably won’t be that easy, but the principle should hold.
d
 
                                                 
d
 Discussion of the sub personal / personal division that is consistent with the view I am advocating can be found 
in Varela et al (1991). I should also reference Andy Clark as his ideas of embodiment and the extended mind 
have highly influenced my thinking, particularly with regards to the personal / sub-personal divide. 




 As indicated, what is needed is a report, from the subject, of what he is thinking. Essentially, 
not that difficult: you could ask him. If the above issues can be surmounted with these techniques, we 
should be able to trust the subject that what he says he is experiencing really is what he is experiencing 
(unless we have another reason to think him untrustworthy (Goldman 2004)). As Roepstorff and Jack 
(2004) note there is no principal problem to getting introspection into science. 
 
 In asking the subject the most common method is by language and verbal report. There are 
many issues surrounding the use of language itself, largely based around reactivity and I have no space 
to consider these separately. So I only wish to highlight that it is a very useful, under-appreciated tool, 
whose regular and sustained usage itself is an aid to reducing reactivity. We only rarely spend time 
formulating a speech act independently of the thought process underlying it, causing and being the 
content. We rarely think before we speak. Obviously this does not eliminate the problem of reactivity, 
but helps reduce it. The use of language as a means to facilitate communication of internal state and 
experience to others is commonsensical (Piccinini 2003) and implicit in its everyday usage. Even 




 As I have indicated, there are problems with first person introspective reports that cast doubt on 
the trustworthiness of some of them. Some reports we can trust and others we should be sceptical 
about. What is the “range of introspective reliability” as Alvin Goldman (2004p14) puts it?  I agree 
with him that we should look largely at the middle ground, to those aspects of consciousness that are 
accepted to fall well within the realm of conscious experience and attention and are easily if not 
implicitly accessible. So, experiences that the subject is sure he is experiencing, like changes in 
stimulus modality, sudden pains, presented colours etc., are those that, because of their unambiguity, 
seem best suited to being used as the phenomenal keys or measures. These subjective experiences can 
therefore be most easily communicated and so are also best candidates for being inter-subjective 
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measures or “second order isomorphisms” (Marcel, 2003 p170), that facilitate across-subject alteration 
to the model, and are the regularities on which the variation of the C variable is based: the independent 
variables. That sounds complicated, but it really is quite simple: reports should be used as an input to 
change in the C variable, and these should correspond to changes in the subjects phenomenology. The 
other input is that of physiological measurements, and the two are tied together and co-vary in the C 
variable; i.e. the reports should inform us about the phenomenal content of the observed physiological 
changes. So, we should use phenomenal changes that the subject is sure he is experiencing. (I realize 
being sure implies reactivity, but the subject does not have to think he is sure at the same time as the 
actual phenomenal experience; he can be sure afterwards (see post task walk through)). This also 
means that we should avoid looking at phenomenal experiences that are beyond the means of the 
subject to report, whether that be due to his not having the conceptual tools to report the phenomena or 
the perceptual ability to access them.  
 
 This does not imply that research which looks at the borders of what is detectable is useless. 
Indeed, research such as that on change blindness and attentional blink (e.g. O'Regan et al 1999) is very 
informative and useful in terms of defining the borders of what we can and cannot be aware of. It's just 
that in terms of getting some concrete first person data on which to base the model, the center ground 
seems the best place to achieve inter-subjective comparison (and keying change in C). We should base 
our research on the things we are sure of and can agree upon. 
 
 The range in variance of the C variable is set by the range in its two inputs. The range of 
physiology that can be tied to phenomenal events is an empirical question that may well be affected by 
problems, such as the third variable etc. that in essence do not differ from problems encountered in any 
other complex system. The range of phenomenology, on the other hand, that corresponds to any 
particular report is in principle unconquerable, due to the explanatory gap. However, the use of the 
discussed techniques, particularly phenomenology, should enable us to work out who and which 
reports to trust, and allow us to develop quite a detailed picture of the variance in any particular 
phenomenal grouping or clustering (Varela 1996). 
 
 Part of Dennett's argument (1988, 2005) is that if there were a disagreement between what I call 
first person data and third person measures, then it should be third science that 'wins'. So, if we had a 
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situation where science has shown physical activity X to correspond to phenomenal experience X and 
we have a subject who insists he is experiencing X, but physiological measures show him to have 
physical activity Y, then Dennett would say we should reject his belief that he is experiencing X. 
Maybe, we are after all fallible, and the subject could have got the whole meaning of phenomenal state 
X wrong in his report. Because I am accepting of fallibility I am not open to this, Dennett's basic anti-
infalabilist argument (2005).  But assuming such a mistake has not occurred (assume the perfect 
introspector) then Dennett may still reject the subject’s opinion, as, for Dennett the report is based on 
something that does not exist (i.e. phenomenal experience, qualia, see 6). However, I think we would 
be better taking the subject seriously and interpreting such a subject as an anomaly, an extreme outlyer 
on the range of physiology that can be associated with a phenomenal event. The range of physiology 
that is determined by science to correspond to particular phenomenology is worked out by the 
discovery of the activity found in the presence (as opposed to the absence) of that phenomenology. It is 
the content of the scientific theory that adapts to include these relationships and outlying anomalies. 
For example this is what happened in the case of synaesthesia (See review by Ramachandran and 
Hubbard 2001); science had thought that plasticity in the adult human brain would not be able to 
produce such effects, and we should treat such subjects as delusional, where as now, such plasticity is 
accepted, so it is science that has folded, not the subject’s opinion about the phenomenal state. So I 
again state that the most productive work in the area is done when the two sides agree and neither 
should be thought of as 'winning'. Dennett can retort by saying that if we have a perfect introspector 
then we should be allowed to make use of a supposed perfect science, in which case there might still be 
the problem of disagreement between the science and phenomenal report. I do not think this is possible 
because the perfect science should take into account such perfect reports and include them in 
determining the range of physiological activity (e.g. Physical Y) associated with phenomenal activity 
X. But this difference between our two positions comes down to whether or not we take the report as 
referring to a phenomenal state (Chalmers and my position, that would lead to the inclusion of physical 
Y in the range of phenomenology X) or not (Dennett’s position that would lead to the rejection of the 
report); which is the unresolved difference in the way we interpret data, that seems to be the unresolved 
shouting match that exists between Chalmers' and Dennett's approaches (Chalmers 2004, Dennett 
2001). It is unresolved because both sides can accuse the other of simply stipulating that reports do or 
do not refer to phenomenal experience. So we must look somewhere else for resolution (See 6). 
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Other Methods 
 
 Here I simply wish to emphasise that I'm not alone in thinking that first person data is possible 
and that it can be used to fill out our explanation of consciousness. Neurophenomenology is a method 
for investigating and integrating the relationship between phenomenology and neuroscience (Varela 
1996). The methods and direction in which I wish to proceed are very similar to those indicated by the 
late Fransisco Varela and I am indebted to his theories. I wish to borrow and highlight three points 
from the general approach in Neurophenomenology: “(i) to obtain richer first-person data through 
disciplined phenomenological explorations of experience, and (ii) to use these original first-person data 
to uncover new third-person data about the physiological processes crucial for consciousness” (Lutz & 
Thompson; on neurophenomenology 2004 p32); and (iii) that this allows the development of clusters of 
phenomenal reports that can be used by the experimenter as inter subjective measures which can be 
conveyed to clusters of third person physiological events (see Gallagher on neurophenomenology 
2003). This clustering on both sides I see as a great means and aid to the development of robust and 
meaningful changes in the C variable.  
 
 Another methodological aid or insight that I wish to include in experimental approaches is of 
front loaded phenomenology (Gallagher 2003). This is very similar to the methods I have indicated and 
those involved in neurophenomenology, except with the emphasis on the experimental set-up; taking 
into account the differences in phenomenology. The independent variables are based in 
phenomenology. This method emphasizes that we should set out explicitly to include and test the 
findings of phenomenology by their inclusion in the experimental design, as indicated in the discussion 
of P without A. 
 
 A criticism may be made that whether or not the scientist can attribute consciousness to agents 
is dependent on their ability to report that they are conscious and so we exclude any agents, or animals 
that do not have linguistic ability. A further criticism is that we need some kind of similarity to other 
agents in order to facilitate the inferential jump (that allows us to attribute consciousness to them). I do 
not accept this, because, as Dennett, we can remain uncommittal about whether or not such creatures 
are conscious prior to investigation or prior to their telling us it is the case. The onus is on the 
experimenter to find a way round (see for example Smith et al 2001). There is no reason to think such 
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creatures should or should not be conscious from this point of view. Also, if P-consciousness is a form 
of consciousness and is as simple as experience, then this might rapidly lead to panpsychism, which is 
the opposite view from that of the original accusation, though I do not intend to explore this route here. 
 
 Another method that is consistent with the view I am advocating is Marbach's (2006) use of 
Husserlian phenomenology, which is used as a catalogue of phenomenal changes that may go on to be 
equated with physiological changes. 
 
More experimental protocols 
 
  There are a number of experimental protocols that should be taken note of, as their application 
to experimental procedure should help reduce the problems mentioned above by increasing reliability 
and reducing reactivity. But because they have little philosophical relevance other than in this way, I 
will not dwell on them (many of these can be found in detail in the Ericsson and Simon lab manual 
(1984)):  
Use of open questions; i.e. do not lead the subject, allow the subject to develop their own report. 
Think-aloud (Ericsson & Simon 1984) protocols, when well practiced, can give insight into thought 
process behind the performance of experimental tasks. 
Post-task walk-through procedures are often considered less reactive than think aloud protocols 
because the subject is asked what he was thinking after the task is complete, often in combination with 
a recording of the experimental task (also known as non-reactive observational techniques)(Ericsson 
2003). This is because the subject is free to have the phenomenal experience during the experiment 
(when the physiological activity is being measured) and is only required to make an A-conscious report 
of it after the experiment 
Comparison of reports between subjects, within subjects and across time, to see if individual subjects 
use particular words in the same way, so aid in getting a grip on phenomenal variance. Examples may 
include verbal semantic tests, or even the Ishihara test for colour blindness as a measure for 
phenomenal variance. 
Comparison between experts at a task and novices can also help elucidate the cognitive process behind 
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the task (Ericsson & Simon1984). This is likened to the effect of training, see below. 
Get the subject to do one thing at a time (Marcel 2003, Roepstorff & Jack 2004). 
Keep it simple. The simpler the response (e.g. button press), the task and the differences between the 
phenomenal states you are trying to get to grips with, the better. So the memory load should be 
minimized, as should the potential for the subject to get confused (unless that’s what your independent 
variable is), and minimize the amount of interpretation required of the subject. Keeping it simple will 
reduce the amount of activity needed to produce a report and hence reduce the problem of reactivity. 
 
Zapping the other way 
 
 Thus far I have largely been discussing going from phenomenal state to third person 
interpretation. There is, however, also the possibility of going the other way (from third person 
knowledge to first person experience) and so confirming the changes highlighted by the model. 
Obviously there is the understanding of third person theories, by the first person, in the form of a 
scientist who can comprehend the findings. As Varela (1996) points out, scientists are communities 
made up of individuals. This is a reason why I see the model as an explanatory tool. 
 
 What is more of interest is that we can use our third person knowledge to inform us on means to 
actually evoke first person phenomenal experiences in the subject, thereby confirming the links we are 
attempting to establish between first person experience and third person data. The electrophysiological 
techniques pioneered by Penfield are much under-appreciated in this respect. They allow us to use third 
person knowledge to make predictions about where to stimulate the surface of the brain, in order to 
give rise to a particular phenomenal sensation (e.g. pain or movement in the subject’s arm, or visual 
field perturbations). These are practicable experimentally and confirmable both behaviorally and via 
first person methods. So now the phenomenal effect becomes the dependent variable and the 
physiology becomes the independent variable. These techniques are not used much any more because 
of the ethical issues that surround such massively invasive methods (which are essentially that they 
have been done before and are dangerous). However, the basic pattern of going from third person 
knowledge of the brain to first person phenomenal experience is alive and in the field of TMS 
(Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation, though this technique is less accurate, it is non invasive) and to 
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 The big aid to first person methodologies is training. It is the most common cure in the literature 
for the problems of the third person (e.g. Ericsson and Simon, Roepstorff and Jack, Marcel, Varela). 
This is, at least in part, because the act of training and becoming familiar with a task, becoming 
habituated to it, can reduce the need for self monitoring, which is clearly a source of reactivity. So the 
activity we observe in the subject will be more due to the activity required to accomplish the task, than 
due to the requirement to report that you have done it. Also the quality of the report will improve if the 
subject is familiar with the task of reporting. So, warming up and familiarization with the stimulus and 
protocol will help (Ericsson 2003).  
 
 I also wish to highlight that training in the art of meditation is a vastly under-appreciated (in 
western science) method of conducting phenomenological exploration (as Varela points out,1996) - 
though as a means of getting to phenomenology, it is slowly becoming accepted. A recent conference at 
MIT  brought together neuroscientists and accomplished practitioners of meditation, and the general 
outcome was very positive and in favor of using the skills of practitioners as tools in conducting 
experiments (See science news (Barinaga 2003) for review of the conference) such as in those 
conducted by Davidson et al 2002. 
 
 One of the reasons I have for calling attention to such training in meditation will become clear 
in the final section. For now, I wish to emphasise that I see no reason for such an introspective 
discipline not to be included in our scientific strategies. It is structured, and so this structure may guide 
and form the basis for the construction of interpersonal measures, enhancing the reproducibility of 
results. Meditation itself is repeatable; one frequently attempts achievement of the same states of 
meditation, and this becomes easier with practice. In short, meditation may well be the most developed 
(historically), formal, reproducible and most far reaching form of all the introspective and 
phenomenological methods. 
 As indicated above, I think that meditation can be used as a way of bringing A- to P-
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consciousness. It is not hard to see how, as this is basically what you are told to do in much of 
meditation, i.e. focus your attention on experience, quite often without any conceptual content. An 
opponent might respond and say, theoretically yes, but does it actually work? Does it bring A- to P-
consciousness? To test this we would need an example of P without A and then to train someone to 
overcome this. If we allow ourselves to forget, for a moment, that the professionals involved with 
blindsight patients (medics and neuroscientists) are of the opinion that such patients are without any 
form of conscious visual experience, and temporarily accept Block's use of blindsighters as examples 
of P- with no A-consciousness, then the question would be, do blindsighters perform better at visual 
discrimination tasks after they have been trained and thought about it? Does meditating on the scene 
help? This last part is an empirical question that has not yet been addressed (as far as I know), but the 
‘does training help?’ bit has been and the answer is yes: blindsight patients who have done a lot of 
these experiments get better at them (Cowey & Storig 1991,1997). So if blindsighters are examples of 
P without A, they can learn to some extent to bring A to P.   
 
6. Dennett, Heterophenomenology and the intentional stance 
 
 What is heterophenomenology? Heterophenomenology is Dennett's own brand of method for 
the investigation of consciousness. It is an exclusively third person method: that is, it involves taking an 
objective, third person attitude to the investigation of consciousness. The word heterophenomenology 
combines phenomenology (the study of conscious experience) and hetero (which means of another, i.e. 
in the third person). He claims (2003) that it “covers all the ground of human consciousness” (p19), and 
“It leaves out no objective phenomena and no subjective phenomenal experience” (p20). Naturally, 
with the premise of the explanatory gap, and my adherence to the first person point of view, and 
because of its 'exclusivity' to only third person methods, I wish to follow Chalmers (1996) and say that 
Dennett is leaving something out, and that is the 'what it is like' aspect of conscious experience which is 
in the first person, not the third. This line of argument has been thoroughly explored elsewhere (e.g. 
Chalmers 1996). 
 
  A point that Dennett makes is that pretty much all of the cognitive and social sciences can be 
subsumed under heterophenomenology, because they are third person investigations, so consistent with 
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his methods (2003, 2005). This make the goal posts very wide (Levine 1994)  a fact that Dennett uses 
to his advantage when he challenges his opponents to name an experiment or investigation that is off 
limits to heterophenomenology, I feel there are such investigations and some these are the first person 
investigations described (e.g. Lutz & Tompson 2003). However, Dennett would undoubtedly say that 
these too can be taken under the wing of Heterophenomenology (Dennett review of Varela et al 1993). 
But as Chalmers (1996) points out all such investigations, that look at the mind, can be understood 
from a first person perspective as well. So whether or not cognitive or social sciences can be 
understood though heterophenomenology does not lend weight to Dennett's argument, if they can be 
understood as 'referring' to and describing first person experience as well.  
 
 The ‘Intentional Stance’ (Dennett 1981, 1988, 1991, 2005) is central to heterophenomenology. 
The intentional stance is essentially a way, an attitude of scientific investigation that allows us to 
attribute beliefs and desires to agents. We view agents in terms of their having contentfull attitudes; 
intentions. Dennett goes on to discuss how these are instantiated in real patterns of activity (1991b). I 
agree with this: it is almost exactly what I have said we should do in terms of inferring that other agents 
are conscious. Indeed I am highly indebted to Dennett’s work in this area and so I see what I have 
proposed to be an adaptation rather than a refutation of what he is saying. Even if Dennett himself is 
not accepting of there being an explanatory gap, the intentional strategy can still be seen as a way of 
instrumentally crossing the gap; a way for the third person to accept that the first person at least has 
beliefs. 
  
 Dennett’s instrumentalism, in connection with intentional states, is very similar to mine 
regarding consciousness in general. This can be seen in his discussion of beliefs being analogous to 
centers of mass (2003p20). Our reasons for choosing such an anti-realist position are different (mine is 
the explanatory gap, his might be the possibility of P with no A or vice versa or even that beliefs might 
correspond to something fictitious). Though instrumentalism is not a phrase he is happy with, he thinks 
of himself as more a “mild-realist” (1991b p30) as we can see in his discussion of Real Patterns 
(1991b), and here I agree to some extent with him that the patterns in actual physiological activity are 
the real instantiations of consciousness, but due to the epistemic considerations any knowledge about 
these will be incomplete. It is worth noting that as far as third person theories go, and they are required 
to bolster that side of the model, such explanations as offered by Dennett are really very good, useful 
and informative, particularly his ideas about thought being temporally and spacially extended (1991). 
However, Dennett only wishes to develop such an instrumental tactic with regard to intentional states. 
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His strategy relating to consciousness is more one of reduction (which largely consists of a reductive 
explanation of what Block has termed A-consciousness through an explanation of ‘global availability’ 
or ‘fame in the brain’(1991,2005)) followed by a chipping away of other attributes such as P-
consciousness through a discussion of, say, ‘consciousness as a cultural construct’- and finally an 
elimination of what ever remains and is unpalatable to a purely third person method (i.e. 
qualia).Unsurprisingly, I think this is the wrong tactic because it results in the elimination of the thing 
we are interested in. Better to extend the instrumentalism to consciousness and get on with the real 
work of seeing how phenomenal and physiological activity run together. 
  
 So, given that I think Dennett’s theory should be adapted, how should it be adapted? Firstly, I 
think that in crossing the explanatory gap in this way there is something that is lost, which is 
experience itself. Third person theories of consciousness are necessarily going to be devoid of this 
(though they may describe it) because that is what a third person theory is. This leads me to the 
conclusion that third person theories will be necessarily incomplete, and so our attitude toward such 
theories, in the third person, should be one of extreme instrumentalism, even more tentative and 
fictitious than Dennett is willing to be. However, this instrumentalism in the third person does not 
afflict the understanding of consciousness in the first person; this can be as real and substantive as 
anything. It is just the third person methods that cannot be complete with regard to consciousness. This 
is how the epistemic aspect of the explanatory gap must express itself. 
 
 My second recommendation for adaptation of Dennett’s theory is that the intentional stance 
should go further than he proposes. It should go beyond intentions to consciousness itself. Attributing 
consciousness to agents would allow first person methods to get off the ground, because once we 
accept that subjects have consciousness we accept there is a unique first person perspective, and we can 
start doing some really productive work in seeing how the first person experience corresponds to the 
physiology that produces it. It is because the intentional stance and its adaptation to include 
consciousness is so fundamental to the production of a first person science that refers to both sides, that 
I have spent so much effort in showing that Dennett’s reasons for not allowing the intentional stance to 
go to consciousness (i.e. outrunning, see above) are not valid. 
 
 However, I think the reasons Dennett chooses not to allow the intentional stance to go to 
consciousness are more covert than those stated by Dennett (2003,2005). I think he does not allow it to 
go all the way to consciousness because it would jeopardise his project of developing an exclusively 
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third person science of consciousness. Having subjects with conscious experience means that there is 
something they might know (i.e. experience or qualia) that the third person investigator might not be 
able to know. So Dennett’s caution regarding moving the intentional stance to consciousness might not 
be due to the problem of outrunning, but would be better placed if he submitted to the explanatory gap 
and said that his third person theory is limited. As I do. 
 
 Dennett’s tactic is instead to deny the explanatory gap (for a shining example see Dennett's 
response to Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument (1982):  What RoboMary Knows (2005 p103-129) 
(for a rebuttal of which I simply defer to Michel Babington’s response What roboDennett still doesn’t 
know(2006))) and offer a reductive explanation in the third person, that is supposed to cover all the 
ground. As noted he denies anything left over that cannot be included on a exclusively third person 
methodology.   
 
Qualia, Definitions of qualia. 
 
 Qualia are notoriously hard to define. It is a term first coined by Lewis in 1929 as the 
“recognizable qualitative characters of the given” (1929, p121) and I am not denying this as a 
definition but the phrase that comes up time and time again in reference to qualia is the ‘What it is like’ 
aspect of experience (probably best attributed to Nagel’s usage of the phrase in What it is  like to be a 
Bat although he does not use the term ‘qualia’ in this piece). So I define qualia as the ‘what is it like’ 
aspect of conscious experience for a subject. This is a broad definition and covers allot and encroaches 
on a myriad of properties, including; awareness, the first person perspective, perception, but 
particularly it refers to the phenomenal aspect of experience. 
 
 The reason I have for using such a broad definition is simply that I cannot think of any 
conscious experiences that have no qualia to them: there is always something that it is like to have any 
conscious experience. There are no members of the class of conscious experience that are without 
qualia. This is consistent with what I have said about the unlikelihood of A-consciousness without P-
consciousness. If you can think of counterexamples please let me know (Zombies need not apply for 
the aforementioned reason). I think such a definition of qualia is consistent with Chalmers' own 
definitions (1996 p4, p359n2 ), as well others including; Dretske’s usage (1994) and Shoemakers 
(1975). 
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 The basic approach, then, of Dennett’s argument is, firstly, to strip down qualia by allowing a 
contrast to be made between qualitative and cognitive activities and then to use this contrast to argue 
out of existence anything that remains. 
 
 Advocating qualia in such a way is the target of Dennett’s paper quining qualia(1988). This 
paper consists of a series of 14 thought experiments or intuition pumps, designed to convince us of the 
unworthiness of a notion of qualia and that we would be best to get rid of the whole thing. This is 
clearly going to be a problem of first person methods because if there is no such thing as qualia, 
nothing it is like to experience (other than a cultural construct), then the first person methods described 
are trying to get a grip on something that does not exist, they will be reaching for nothing. I cannot 
concur with such a dismissal because I do not agree with the notion of qualia he uses and then discards. 
Following Dretske (1994), if such a conception of qualia were to be accepted, I too might consider 
dropping them. So what is Dennett’s notion of qualia? Dennett offers the four-fold definition of qualia 
as that which has the properties of being: “1) ineffable 2) intrinsic 3) private 4) directly or immediately 
apprehensible in consciousness”(Dennett 1988 p4). However, such a definition of qualia is not widely 
used (outside the discussion of Dennett’s thesis). Reasons for rejecting such a definition are offered by 
Dretske (1994 p49-54) and Lormand (1994 p127-154) where the definition is discussed and rejected as 
incoherent. As Dretske puts it “according to Dennett's own characterization it is difficult to see how 
qualia could fail to be effable”(1994 p53). I agree with this and wish to highlight that much of the work 
done by Dennett in the rejection of qualia relies on a contrast between qualia and other cognitive 
activities that is simply incoherent, if these cognitive activities have a quale to them. 
 
 One of the intuition pumps Dennett discusses is the case of Mr Chase and Mr Sanborn. Here he 
tries to show that qualia are false because differences in Mr Chase’s and Mr Sanborn’s opinions about 
how their qualia have changed over time is unreliable, and nether they nor a scientist investigating 
these changes could shed any light on what it is that has changed, hence there is nothing substantive on 
which to base our notion of qualia. If Chase and Sanborn cannot be sure that they were in one of two 
situations, then neither could the scientist and we should therefore (because science should be able to 
measure a change if there really is one) reject qualia. This move, that causes Chase and Sanborn to be 
unsure as to the relationship between their qualia and e.g. their memories (p10) or reactive attitudes 
(p10), is facilitated by the contrast he makes between qualia and other cognitive activities. It is this 
contrast that I think is a weak point, and it results from his overly restrictive definition of qualia. For 
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example, he says that Sanborn's qualia have shifted but his reactive attitudes towards them have stayed 
constant. But there seems that there must be is something it is like to actually have a reactive attitude 
towards something, it has qualia.  Just because we can explain a 'reactive attitude' in terms of functional 
relations does not mean its expression is suddenly freed from qualia or phenomenal experience. The 
reductive explanation does not in itself preclude the experience of a reactive attitude from having 
qualia to it, (instead an explanation should offer a different perspective on the same event, experience, 
and should if done properly support the existence of phenomenal experience). At the very least, having 
a reactive attitude toward coffee is going to involve reacting to the coffee; drinking it. It is very 
difficult to see how this is not going to involve tasting it as well. It seems apparent that the actual 
expression of a reactive attitude must involve coffee qualia. To ask; did the qualia come before or after 
the reactive attitude, as Dennett does (p10), therefore makes little sense, not because there are no qualia 
but because the reactive attitude, in its expression must have qualia. So on my conception (and others 
e.g. Chalmers, Shoemaker, Dretske etc) of qualia what Dennett is really saying is that Sanborn's taste 
qualia have shifted while his taste qualia have stayed the same!?  
  
 The conception of qualia that Dennett ridicules relies on a modular conception of mind to 
facilitate this contrast (hence “before…after qualia phase”, 1988 p10) that he himself rejects (1991) in 
his idea that the mind may be temporally and spatially extended or “smeared” (1991 p119). What he 
seems to have failed to realize is that the qualia realist does not have to have a Cartesine conception of 
mind; such temporal and spacial extension is perfectly consistent with the view of qualia I and other 
qualiaophiles advocate (e.g. Chalmers (1998) and Varela (1991)). 
 
 The objection on which this is based (i.e. that his definition of qualia is overly restrictive and 
allows him to get away with unacceptable contrasts) is briefly discussed in quining qualia, where he 
enters a brief confrontation with Shoemaker (private correspondence with Dennett (1988)), in which 
Shoemaker, having discounted Dennett's definition (for similar reasons as I have indicated) gets the 
same treatment as from Dennett as he denies Shoemaker's use of 'phenomenal'. Dennett then proceeds 
to offer a reductive physiological explanation for 'phenomenal', which he then withdraws as soon as he 
has proposed it, because he realizes that this physiology is inaccessible to introspection, hence 
incapable of standing in for phenomenal. So instead he, in a roundabout way, says it could come down 
to experience (1988 p4-5). Great! What is the one thing the third person experimenter is not allowed to 
do in heterophenomenology? Experience the experiment. Also he has in one word managed to justify 
all my conflation between qualia, first person, phenomenal experience and consciousness. 
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 However, even if we reject Dennett’s definition of qualia, then there still may be a problem 
lurking in his paper when these untenable contrasts are striped away, that may cause difficulties for any 
theory that wishes to get the first person talking to the third (although I think it is a problem for Dennett 
as well). This is the problem of inverted spectrum (Dennett intuition pumps 3,5,6 and 8 1988). The 
inverted spectrum argument is essentially; how can we know that what it is like for me to experience a 
blue object is not what you experience as red when viewing the same object? The inverted spectrum 
argument is a long and convoluted one that encroaches on many aspect of philosophy, particularly 
theories of reference which I have no desire to wrestle with here, but here I wish to look at the different 
ways we might come to negotiate this problem in the development of theories. 
 
 Dennett, I would guess would say there is nothing 'it is like', no qualia, in which case the 
problem is void. Unsurprisingly, I interpret this as yet another guise of the explanatory gap because to 
go from my experience to yours is across people, across the gap and as such I think it insurmountable, 
in terms of deduction. However, this does not prevent the inference that, when two people view the 
same object it appears to them in a similar way. And from there we can go on to get measures of how 
similar or different it appears to me or you. This will involve getting a grip on phenomenal variance 
through behavioral measures such as the Ishihara colour blindness test. However 'behavioural 
measures' is not a phrase I am happy with, because I think (along with Chalmers) they refer to 
differences in qualitative state, not just behaviour. As a colour blind person I'm pretty sure what it is 
like for me to see red is not what it is like for the majority of the population; I have certainly been 
known to say “that's a great shade of red” only to be told it’s brown. Such tests, corresponding to 
phenomenal, qualitative differences (as I and Chalmers take them to be), would likely be interpreted by 
Dennett as highlighting differences in perceptual ability, not qualitative differences. To which I again 
respond by questioning the possibility of there being instances where perceptual ability is actually 
expressed, and part of consciousness awareness
e
 that are without qualia. Dennett would no doubt 
respond by saying that I am, in a round about way, just restating that I think perceptual differences refer 
                                                 
e
 There is no reason to think that the actual content of 'having a perceptual disability' need be in the content of 
conscious experience, only that it would shape and affect the production of phenomenal experience, affecting the 
content; yes, but there is no reason to think the disability was the content. The sub-personal mechanisms may 
produce the experience but they are not its content. This aspect is the sub-personal / personal division which is a 
separate argument. 
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to qualitative differences, and so the Dennett-Chalmers shouting match continues without resolution. 
So I now turn to a problem for Dennett. 
 
 
A possible problem for Dennett: 
 
 Dennett repeatedly (1991,2003,2005,2006) challenges advocates of first person methodologies 
to come up with experiments or studies that are shut off to heterophenomenological methods. So, other 
than differences in interpretation of data (viz Chalmers-Dennett debate), what does Dennett admit is 
not allowed by heterophenomenology? Dennett say when “the subject and the experimenter are one and 
the same person, that is a foul” (2003p23). I feel that the study of meditation represents exactly this 
type of inquiry. In order to develop an understanding of meditation the investigator must experience 
meditation, and in so doing become the subject in his own experiment. Anyone who wishes to be 
knowledgeable about meditation is going to have to do more than to acquire third person knowledge, 
they must be practitioners. The scientist could learn something from third person measures of a 
meditating subject or even talking to practitioners, no doubt, indeed this might be very informative, and 
I advocated such inquiry. Such data can be used to reinforce both sides. But to suggest that such 
exclusively third person investigation of meditation, declares itself to represent understanding that is in 
any way complete, is almost laughable. This is because to be knowledgeable about meditation requires 
that you yourself practise it. You will never find a monk who is a knowledgeable scholar who is not or 
has not been a practitioner of a tradition. Dennett cannot argue that it can be subsumed under 
heterophenomenology because a necessary part of understanding meditation is doing it, experiencing it 
yourself. 
 
 Dennett might say meditation is not a science, and his challenge was to name a scientific study 
that cannot fall under heterophenomenology. But this is only because meditation is not a third person 
method. Dennett cannot have it both ways; he cannot challenge us to come up with studies, say what 
these investigations would involve (which is a first person method), in doing so saying they are 
possible - and then, when you have come up with such a study, say it's not a study. It was he who stated 
what the study would have to involve. I don't think the example of meditation differs from the “lone-
wolf” (2003p23) methods he disallows. Additionally, meditation resembles science in other respects; it 
has structure, seems to be reproducible, makes predictions, helps understanding etc. The only thing that 
science might be that meditation is not is third person, although, as Varela (1996) points out, the 
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scientific community is made up of individuals. It seems to me science might well be able to swell to 
take on board the addition of the first person perspective and adhere to one of its aims to leave nothing 




 Dennett would more likely say that meditation is just hocus pocus or smoke (or incense) and 
mirrors, and it is not any different from any other form of introspective thinking or self-monitoring 
meta-cognitive act. However, the only way to know whether or not it is hocus pocus is to try it 
yourself, thus again committing the foul. Even if it is just introspection we can substitute meta-
cognition for meditation and the argument still runs. In order to avoid the foul Dennett speaks of, the 
scientist whose job it is to investigate self-monitoring meta-cognition, must be able to achieve 
knowledge that is complete without ever having performed such introspection themselves. In doing so 
they might add to their knowledge by means of effectively being the subject in there own experiment. I 




                                                 
f
 The wider implications for science are not my quarry here, the above is really meant to demonstrate a problem 
for Dennett's methods as I think science in general is perfectly capable of inclusion of first person approaches. 
Although (because I do not wish to leave this incomplete) I recognize that such addition of the first person is an 
expansion of the explanatory base in this manner will jeopardize sciences adherence to pure reduction (Kim 
2005). However, this might be negotiated by reference to token identity, in that physical and phenomenal stuff 
are all one event. Taken together with an instrumental view of science (and therefore its inbuilt flexibility to take 
things on board) and the point that this sacrifice, of reduction, might need only be made in a science of mind, 
where the first person perspective is the subject matter. This might make us more inclined to think that, in losing 
reduction and gaining first person perspective and experience in our explanations, in our science, we gain more 
than we loss. 
Kim would also probably ask how the model deals with mental causation, and I can only apologise for not 
having space to expanding on this here.  
  37  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
 Part of the mind/body problem is the explanatory gap, the gap between first and third person 
knowledge. I have tried to develop a model that is capable of a least referring to both sides. Getting it to 
refer to the first person side is the tricky bit, and here I use, amongst other things, an adaptation of 
Dennett's intentional stance that allows us to attribute consciousness to agents. Dennett's reasons for not 
going this far have been my chief problems as has his denial of first person methods altogether. 
 
 So, while I am not suggesting that such a model is capable of closing the explanatory gap, if we 
know explicitly where the gap is, we can mind it, and infer (use of the C variable) and side step (use of 
experimental protocols) our way round it, ending up with, something that is conducive to real progress 
being made in the sciences of mind towards the inclusion of subjective experience, and with the 
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